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INTRODUCTION
It is widely,' though hardly universally,2 held that the promotion and defense
of human rights precisely as human rights, is desirable as a matter of morality,
* Lawrence A. Jegen III Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. The author's thanks go to Rachel Anne Scherer and the staff of the Indiana Law
Review.
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW,
COURTS 4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (arguing that "[a]lthough it is only one morality among
many, the morality of human rights has become the dominant morality of our time"); see also The
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr.
2. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, at 111 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds.,
1993); Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM.. L. REV. 1758 (2008)
(seeking to distinguish and focus in practice on the promotion of human welfare rather than human
rights). We set aside for the moment any broader philosophical or scientific position that is plainly
incompatible with typical understandings of human rights. For one example of such a materialist
view, see infra note 84. For a somewhat different perspective, consider the well-regarded novelist
Mary Gordon: "[W]e say we believe 'all men are created equal,' but we don't live, we probably
don't even want to live, as if it were true." MARY GORDON, READING JESUS: A WRITER'S
ENCOUNTER WITH THE GOSPELS 93 (2009). For an attempt to combine a form of relativism with
Kantian or Aristotelian approaches, see STEVEN LUKES, MORAL RELATIVISM 158-59 (2008).
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law, and policy. But what if the very idea of a defensible human right is, in
various ways, disintegrating before us? This Review explores this possibility.
The past few years have seen the publication of a remarkable number of
deeply considered books on the theories of human rights, basic justice, and
related subjects. The particular books listed above and briefly referred to below,
as much as they vary among themselves, all fit within this category. The reader
of this Review must be forewarned that none of these books focuses centrally on
the question of the disintegration of the idea of a defensible human right, the
theme of this Review. Broader and lengthier synopses of each of the books are
but a few clicks away. But if the idea of a human right is indeed in the process
of unraveling, that fact alone is worth noting.
Out of respect for the respective book authors and the readers of this Review,
however, we will consider each book separately and in turn, as opposed to merely
swirling each throughout, as fragments in a thematic essay. Each book will be
introduced, but the depth of scholarship, care, and subtlety in argumentation, and
the sheer breadth of scope of each will preclude fair summary herein.
Nor does any uniquely best order of presentation suggest itself, even for the
sake of establishing our disintegrationist theme. Let us therefore simply begin
with what is in some ways the most metaphysically ambitious and academically
controversial treatment, that of the distinguished philosopher Nicolas
Wolterstorff.
I. WOLTERSTORFF'S EXPLICIT THEISM
Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that there are genuine human rights only
because, or only if, there is a God of a traditional sort who "bestows" the
necessary sort of worth on human beings through God's permanent and equal"attachment" love for every human being.' Human rights are thus not
fundamentally a matter of a divine command,4 nor do they exist because of any
3. The very heart of Wolterstorfif's obviously broader and more nuanced account is found
at NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 352-61 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008)
[hereinafter WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS]. For a highly condensed partial
version, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Can Human Rights Survive Secularization?, 54 VILL. L. REv.
411 (2009). For discussion, see Richard J. Bernstein, Does He Pull It Of?. A Theistic Grounding
of Natural Inherent Human Rights?, 37 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 221 (2009); Mark C. Murphy, Book
Review, 119 ETHICS 402 (2009); Paul Weithman, God's Velveteen Rabbit, 37 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS
243 (2009); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice as Inherent Rights: A Response to My Commentators,
37 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 261 (2009) [hereinafter Wolterstorff, Justice as Inherent Rights]
(responding in particular to Bernstein and Weithman, supra), as well as the brief reviews by Daniel
A. Dombrowski, Book Review, 89 J. RELIGION 278 (2009) and Richard W. Garnett, Righting
Wrongs and Wronging Rights, 186 FIRST THINGS 48 (2008).
4. For a sampling of the variety and sophistication of Divine Command (or Divine
Preference) theories of ethics more broadly, see, for example, ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, FINITE
AND INFINITE GOODS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS (1999); THOMAS L. CARSON, VALUE AND THE
GOOD LIFE (2000); MARK C. MURPHY, AN ESSAY ON DviNE AUTHORITY (2002); LINDA TRINKAUS
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inherent quality or capacity humans possess, 5 nor are there adequate secular
grounds for a belief in equal and universal human rights.6
To shed light on the idea of God's attachment love for human beings,
Wolterstorff refers to the case of a child whose fondness and attachment for a
particular teddy bear is not, and perhaps never was, dependent upon any inherent
qualities of the bear in question.7 We may assume the child's attachment love or
bonding to persist despite, or even because of, the bear's now undeniably
tattered, raggedy condition. Independent of the child's attachment love, we
might see no reason not to consign the otherwise undistinguished, fungible,
perhaps even unwholesome bear to the dumpster.
But if we choose to preserve and maintain the bear, our doing so may reflect
more than mere sentimentality or even empathy for the child. We may sensibly
believe that although we would, of course, not be wronging the bear itself in
disposing of it, we might well be genuinely wronging the child.
We must now replace the parties in this case with their counterparts. The
raggedy, intrinsically undistinguished bear corresponds, at least in some loose
sense, to every human being. The potential discarder of the raggedy bear
becomes any person or entity that might choose to violate the human rights of
any human being. And for the child, we substitute a God who loves all human
beings, whatever their defects and impairments, universally, equally, and
permanently, in a way that bestows or confers worth on all such persons, of a sort
that grounds their human rights.
Wolterstorff is careful to emphasize that he has not tried to show the
existence of the necessary sort of God.' His argument for human rights is thus
hypothetical, or contingent upon theistic commitments not argued for. Certainly,
ZAGZEBSKI, DIVINE MOTIVATION THEORY (2004); Philip L. Quinn, Divine Command Theory, in
THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 53 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000). For discussion of
an earlier perspective, see Peter King, Ockham's Ethical Theory, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO OCKHAM 227 (Paul Vincent Spade ed., 1999).
5. See, e.g., WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS, supra note 3, at 352, and more
generally at 348-61. Wolterstorffthus does not rely heavily on the traditional idea of the imago dei,
or of all humans being created in the relevant image and likeness of God. See id. at 348-52 and
infra note 6.
6. See WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS, supra note 3, at 323-41 (discussing
in succession the proposals of Immanuel Kant, Ronald Dworkin, and Alan Gewirth). The general,
overarching response is roughly that all the secular properties we might point to are either
insufficiently meaningful to bear the weight, or are not shared by all humans, or plainly come in
degrees in such a way as to undermine equality of rights. For further discussion, see JOHN E.
COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT
(1999); JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY (2002).
7. See WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS, supra note 3, at 359-60.
8. See id at 360-61. For what amounts at least roughly to an attempt along those lines,
based on a cumulative-case Bayesian probabilistic argument, see RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD (2d ed. 2004). See also WILLIAM LANE CRAIG & QUENTIN SMITH, THEISM,
ATHEISM, AND BIG BANG COSMOLOGY (1993).
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Wolterstorff is entitled to rely on an intellectual division of labor in this respect.9
It is also open to anyone to reject any one or more, if not all, of Wolterstorff s
theistic premises.'" For all such critics, Wolterstorff's argument cannot get off
the ground. Wolterstorff has in this sense given the contemporary secularist no
compelling reason to accept the idea of equal and universal human rights.
Of course, even an argument as thoughtful as Wolterstorff's will inevitably
be subject to internal critique as well. Perhaps the most important such internal
critique is suggested by Wolterstorff's own teddy bear case. Simply put, we may
wrong the child if we callously discard the raggedy bear. But we clearly do not
thereby also wrong the bear itself. Now, human beings generally seem much
more susceptible of being wronged than do teddy bears. On Wolterstorff s
account, we can fathom why seriously wronging a human being could count as
a serious wrong against God. But it remains unclear why, on Wolterstorff's
account, the wrong accrues not only against God, but also against the human
being upon whom worth has been bestowed, and in the specific form of a human
rights violation."
II. MACINTYRE'S OCCLUDED THEISM
Alasdair MacIntyre's most recent contributions to ethical theory 2 are widely
known and respected. To the book under review, 3 MacIntyre has contributed a
fifty-two-page chapter entitled "Intractable Moral Disagreements,"' 4 as well as
9. It is also possible that if someone found Wolterstorffs account of human rights to
otherwise be the best or even the only convincing account, that judgment could perhaps count as
an argument, of some weight, backwards, in favor of Wolterstorf's theistic premises. See
Wolterstorff, Justice As Inherent Rights, supra note 3, at 272.
10. See, for example, the discussion of Richard Rorty's non-metaphysical pragmatism in
Timothy P. Jackson, The Theory and Practice of Discomfort: Richard Rorty and Pragmatism, 51
THOMIST 270 (1987) and Bernstein, supra note 3, at 231-33. For one very specific question, we
might, assuming God's existence, ask how we could reasonably determine whether God's love in
history is equal for all persons and groups.
11. For discussion, see Weithman, supra note 3. For Wolterstorf's response to Weithman,
see Wolterstorff, Justice as Inherent Rights, supra note 3, at 274-75 (arguing that "[b]estowed
honor is a form of worth").
12. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMANS
BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL
ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION (1990); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988), and classically, ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3 d
ed. 2007) (1981). Critically, see the edited collections ALASDAIR MACINTYRE (Mark C. Murphy
ed., 2003); AFTER MACINTYRE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORK OF ALASDAIR MACINTYRE
(John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1994).
13. INTRACTABLEDISPUTESABOUTTHENATURALLAw: ALASTAIRMACINTYRE AND CRITICS
(Lawrence S. Cunningham ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 2009) [hereinafter INTRACTABLE
DISPUTES].
14. AlasdairMaclntyre, Intractable MoralDisagreements, in INTRACTABLE DISPUTES, supra
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a twenty-page response to several accompanying critiques. 5
Among what persons commonly disagree over are the very existence,
substance, and enforcement of human rights. 6 To what extent are such
disagreements subject to consensual rational resolution? In answering this
question, Maclntyre draws upon his own prior work in the Aristotelian-Thomistic
natural law tradition, 7 along with elements of the communicative ethics of
Jurgen Habermas.18 Maclntyre seeks to show both the power and the limitations
of his own approach to human rights.
MacIntyre, unlike Wolterstorff, seeks to avoid any appeal to theistic
premises, as opposed to more generally accessible insights of reason.'9 His
argument, however, implicitly relies on theistic ideas for support. In the end his
argument would in a sense be strengthened on its own terms, while being
rendered much more controversial, by acknowledging his need for specifically
theistic premises. There seems no escape from this dilemma in practical
persuasion.
note 13, at 1.
15. Alasdair Maclntyre, From Answers to Questions: A Response to the Responses, in
INTRACTABLE MORAL DISPUTES, supra note 13, at 313.
16. See Jean Porter, Does the Natural Law Provide a Universally Valid Morality?, in
INTRACTABLE DISPUTES, supra note 13, at 53.
17. Among the most noteworthy recent treatments of natural law theory, any of which cites
earlier work, see, for example, AQUINAS'S SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: CRITICAL ESSAYS (Brian Davies
ed., 2006); REBECCA KONYNDYK DEYOUNG ET AL., AQUINAS'S ETHICS: METAPHYSICAL
FOUNDATIONS, MORAL THEORY, AND THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT: RECLAIMING THE TRADITION FOR
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (2009); THE ETHICS OF AQUINAS (Stephen J. Pope ed., 2002); JOHN FINNIs,
AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGALTHEORY (1998); PAMELAM. HALL, NARRATIVE AND THE
NATURAL LAW: AN INTERPRETATION OF THOMISTIC ETHICS (1994); MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL
LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLrICS (2006); NATURAL LAW AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al., eds. 2001); NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert
P. George ed., 1992); JEAN PORTER, NATURAL & DIVINE LAW: RECLAIMING THE TRADITION FOR
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1999); JEAN PORTER, NATURE AS REASON (2005): ELEONORE STUMP, AQUINAS
(2003).
18. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., MIT
Press 1996); JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Christian
Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990); JORGEN HABERMAS, REASON AND
THE RATIONALIzATIONOFSOCIETY (Thomas McCarthytrans., Beacon Press 1984); see also JORGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION (Ciaran Cronin ed., Polity Press 2008); THE
COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY (Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr, eds. 1990). For a
specific application, see R. George Wright, Traces of Violence: Gadamer, Habermas, and the Hate
Speech Problem, 76 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 991 (2000).
19. In seeking to develop a largely Thomistically-inspired natural law theory that purports
to not depend upon theistic premises, MacIntyre implicitly follows the example of JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). Finnis' argument would also require accepting
theistic premises to achieve plausibility on its own terms. But of course, adding in specifically
theistic premises reduces the appeal of the entire argument for many persons.
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At a general level, Maclntyre contends that arguments for or against human
rights can gain some real purchase even across different traditions of thought.
One tradition may be better able than the other to predict, explain, and resolve
problems and breakdowns internal to the other tradition, as perhaps both
traditions self-critically evolve.2" But on the other hand, and by way of
limitation, there may be insufficient shared premises and common ground for
even a rationally superior tradition to inescapably rationally defeat the arguments
of its opponents.2
Maclntyre's own particular argument is that as social beings, we require
universally free, open, unthreatening, and unconstrained social deliberation over
the truth of the best means to promote our visions of the ultimate human good
and of the proper roles of other human goods. Our collective deliberation over
time must, by its nature, aim at achieving insights into truth, rather than merely
expressing preexisting inequalities of power, uncritical self-interest, irrationality,
or any threat to coerce any participant.22
These conditions for the social deliberative pursuit of truth are said to be"universal," "exceptionless," and "presupposed" as "principles [of] practical
reasoning," rather than drawn as conclusions at the end of our practical
reasoning.23 But crucially, according to Maclntyre, in recognizing these qualities
of shared practical deliberation, we have already thereby accepted (identical)
principles of Thomistic natural law, and have also come some distance in
understanding how the natural law requires that a just political society itself be
structured.24
We can, however, imagine a cogent response to Maclntyre from, say, the
utilitarian tradition. There are many possible forms of utilitarianism, with none
evidently purer than many others. A utilitarian, intent on somehow maximizing
utility, in some sense, over some time frame, certainly need not feel bound by
Maclntyre's argument generally, or for human rights in particular.26 Utilitarians
may, or may not, accept any universal rules of the sort endorsed by Maclntyre.
A utilitarian might under certain conditions for the sake of utility exclude certain
persons from the deliberative process, or constrain their participation in certain
respects.27
20. See Maclntyre, Intractable MoralDisagreements, in INTRACTABLEDISPUTES, supra note
13, at 4, 33.
21. See id. at 4, 32.
22. See id. at 20-23.
23. See id. at 24.
24. Seeid. at 23.
25. See the very useful distinctions articulated in David Lyons, The Moral Opacity of
Utilitarianism, in MORALrrY, RULES, AND CONSEQUENCES: A CRmCAL READER 105 (Brad Hooker
et al. eds., 2000).
26. See Maclntyre, Intractable MoralDisagreements, in INTRACTABLE DISPUTES, supra note
13, at 31.
27. It is probably fair to include even J.S. Mill within this category, in several respects. See
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1859). For
[Vol. 43:423
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Utilitarian departures from Maclntyre's exceptionless rules might, contrary
to Maclntyre's own system, be based not on any a priori principle, but on
accumulated experience. Perhaps the utilitarian would conclude that limiting the
universality of the pursuit of truth in some contexts actually speeds the discovery
or dissemination of truth. Or we might conclude that limiting the deliberative
participation of, say, Holocaust deniers pays for itself in other values, even apart
from truth.28
In any event, we, along with the utilitarians, could easily envision reasonable
departures from the universalist procedures and human rights positions adopted
by MacIntyre. Truth is not something that is simply pursued maximally,
whatever the costs, or else held in contempt. Truth can rationally be pursued and
disseminated at various rates over time, in light of inescapable tradeoffs among
whatever contributes to truth-seeking, or tradeoffs with other values.
It would certainly be possible for Maclntyre to, in a sense, strengthen his
human rights and other natural law arguments with helpful theistic premises.
Maclntyre might then argue, for example, that divine providence serves to
infallibly guarantee that lying to a person, or that intentionally and directly
limiting that person's deliberative participation, can, over the course of eternity,
never pay off in terms of utility, or any other value. But such a theistic
buttressing-or grounding-would of course only invite objection and dissent
on any number of reasonable grounds.29
I. PERRY'S CHALLENGE TO PURELY SECULAR HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY
Michael J. Perry's work on human rights is a remarkably sophisticated
treatment of an unusually broad range of systematically related questions. It
ranges from metaethics to subtle issues of legislative and judicial recognition and
enforcement, domestically and internationally, typically presented in the context
of controversial substantive human rights issues.3" Our focus, however, will be
on Perry's narrower critique of some prominent secular, or presumably secular,
accounts of human rights.
Perry's own positive doctrine of the foundation of human rights is theistically
based. The basic human rights claim is that "every human being has inherent
discussion of the limitations of typical utilitarian theory as a human rights theory, see, for example,
JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 92-93 (1987).
28. See generally R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The
Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 527 (2006).
29. We saw this more directly and explicitly in the context of Nicholas Wolterstorff's
argument, supra Part I. For a broader critique of MacIntyre's argument, see Porter, Does the
Natural Law Provide a Universally Valid Morality?, in INTRACTABLE DISPUTES, supra note 13, at
74-75, 81, 90-91.
30. In addition to the present volume, see, for example, MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41 (1998), as well as MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL
MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ch. 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
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dignity and is inviolable.",31 The ground for this assertion reflects God's nature,
our own nature, the world, and the relationships between ourselves and God. In
particular, we "are the beloved children of God" and thus, at least analogically,
universally "sisters and brothers to one another. 3 2 In loving one another, and by
implication respecting one another's human rights, we also contribute to our
ultimate flourishing and fulfillment,33 though we are not aiming at our own
flourishing as a goal in doing so. 34 Perry's theistic argument is logically separate
from any possible claims that religious motivation itself commonly inspires
human rights violations, that religious non-believers can consistently respect
human rights, and that there can be all sorts of non-theistic reasons, including
sheer self-interest, to support the idea of human rights.35
Perry's argument against the viability of purely secular human rights theories
does not take the form of a universal impossibility theorem, as in the work of
Kurt G6del, 36 or Kenneth Arrow.37 Perry instead inductively examines some of
the leading candidates for a secular theory of human rights. Among these are the
widely recognized works of John Finnis,38 Ronald Dworkin,39 Martha
Nussbaum, 40 contemporary evolutionary biologists, 4' and in a rather more
31. PERRY, supra note 1, at 6.
32. See id. at 8.
33. Seeid. at9. More starkly, see HANSURS vONBALTHASAR, LOvEALONE IS CREDIBLE 101
(D.C. Schindler trans., Ignatius Press 2004) (1963) ("Love alone is credible; nothing else can be
believed, and nothing else ought to be believed...
34. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 11.
35. This is distinct from offering any stable and viablejustification and motivation for human
rights themselves. It does seem entirely possible, though, for the identification and specification
of particular human rights to draw upon secular considerations, including secular versions of ideas
such as love, dignity, respect, and equality, as long as those results are compatible with any theistic
conceptions necessary for their deeper justification. This issue is raised in Mark Modak-Truran,
Book Review, 88 J. RELIGION 257, 258 (2008).
36. See, e.g., DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN
BRAID (20th Anniversary ed. 1999).
37. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed., Yale Univ.
Press 1970).
38. See FINNIS, supra note 19. For discussion of traditional natural law theory as ultimately
dependent upon theistic premises, as opposed to merely an autonomous secular reason, see, for
example, Russell Hittinger, Natural Law as "Law": Reflections on the Occasion of "Veritatis
Splendor," 39 AM. J. JuRIs. 1, 11-16 (1994).
39. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 20-21; see also RONALD M. DwORKIN, JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010).
40. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 22-23.
41. See id. at 23-25. Perhaps the single most useful source, incorporating a range of
sophisticated perspectives, is EVOLUTION AND ETHICS: HUMAN MORALITY IN BIOLOGICAL AND
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE (Philip Clayton & Jeffrey Schloss eds., 2004). See also RICHARD JOYCE,
THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY (2006); ANTHONY O'HEAR, BEYOND EVOLUTION: HUMAN NATURE
AND THE LIMITS OF EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION (1997); HOLMES ROLSTON, III, GENES, GENESIS
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skeptical vein, the pragmatist Richard Rorty.4 2
Even the most skeptical theorist-perhaps a pure materialist, who denies
irreducible human consciousness, genuine freedom, and personhood in the
traditional sense-can still appropriate the language of human rights, and endorse
human rights on the basis of a broad, mysterious intuition.43 But any secular
theory of human rights must also justify the universal reach and equality of
human rights, in the face of obvious inequalities among genetic human beings.
And the secular human rights theorist, including the secular evolutionary
biologist, must finally account reasonably for the substantial and perhaps
unrecognized sacrifices we might owe, individually or as a group, to distant
genetic strangers who can provide no reciprocity or recompense to anyone.
It can sometimes be personally or professionally beneficial for us to endorse
verbally a moral position that, if actually implemented as policy, would call for
our own substantial sacrifice, or that might be arbitrary or deeply incoherent."
At some point, though, the secular human rights theorist must explain how a
potentially demanding theory of human rights45 could over the long run, widely
motivate, substantial and perhaps unrecognized sacrifices of individual or group
interest for the sake of genetic strangers who cannot possibly repay us, directly
or indirectly.
AND GOD (1999); PETER SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT: POLiTICS, EVOLUTION AND COOPERATION
(1999). For a skeptical reference, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND
IDOLATRY 79 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) (suggesting some realistic limits to genetic altruism).
42. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 26-29; see also Jackson, supra note 10. For broader
discussion of Rorty, see, for example, ALAN MALACHOWSKI, RICHARD RORTY (2002); RICHARD
RORTY (Charles Guignon & David R. Hiley eds., 2003); RORTY AND His CRITICS (Robert B.
Brandom ed., 2000). See also SUSAN NEIMAN, MORAL CLARITY: A GUIDE FOR GROWN-UP
IDEALISTS 88-89 (rev. ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2009) (arguing that "in many fields-like the law
... the metaphysical questions Rorty dismissed are of great concern. For habits are just habits, and
those that require any effort tend to succumb to inertia in the absence of principle").
43. For a sophisticated version ofcontemporary intuitionism, see MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL
INTUITIONISM (2005). See also ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION
AND INTRINSIC VALUE (2005); ETHICALINTUITIONISM: RE-EVALUATIONS (Philip Stratton-Lake ed.,
2003). For a brief argument that human rights are, and should be thought of as, indemonstrably
self-evident, see Amitai Etzioni, The Normativity of Human Rights Is Self-Evident, 32 HUM. RTS.
Q. 187 (2010).
44. See Michael Huemer, Why People Are Irrational About Politics, http://home.sprynet.
com/-owll/irrationality.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
45. See, for example, the classic early discussion by Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and
Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229,231 (1972), and PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE:
OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE 134 (1996). From religious perspectives, for example, GARTH L.
HALLETT, CHRISTIAN NEIGHBOR-LOVE: AN ASSESSMENT OF SIX RIVAL VERSIONS 3-6 (1989);
TIMoTHY P. JACKSON, THE PIORITY OF LOVE: CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 10 (2003).
For a religious response to the gulf between a broad and generous conception of human rights and
the limits of stable, long-term sacrificial human motivation, see JOHN E. HARE, THE MORAL GAP:
KANTIAN ETHICS, HUMAN LIMITS, AND GOD'S ASSISTANCE 1 (1996).
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The ultimate problem is that what is advertised as a secular human rights
theory may turn out to be dependent-"parasitic" would be the more pejorative
term-on a gradually abandoned theistic culture, however much theism may
itself be responsible for human rights violations. The concern is for the long-
term, overall motivational effects of what we might call a "deracination," in
which the idea of human rights is uprooted from its nourishing soil, and carefully
placed in the lapel of civilization's evening jacket.46 Professor Perry rightly
leaves this ultimate concern as an open question.47
IV. GRIFFIN'S SEARCH FOR HuMAN RIGHTS DETERMINACY
James Griffin argues that "[w]hen during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the theological content of the idea [of human rights] was abandoned,
nothing was put in its place," leaving us with only "indeterminate" references to
"human right."'48 Griffin's own proposal seeks what is called a constructivist, or
a coherentist as distinct from a rigorously foundationalist,49 justification for
human rights." Denying that there is a "sharp" distinction here between "fact
and value,"'" Griffin argues that we have a basic interest-our lives generally go
better-in the promotion of our personhood or our rational capacity for"normative agency. 52 Normative agency is in turn the "capacity to choose and
46. It is certainly possible to argue that well-meaning persons of any sort, even fifty years
from now, will retain a certain basic empathy for the elemental sufferings of others, even distant
strangers. Let us hope so, but let us also hope that progress in pharmacology over the next fifty
years does not dull the edge of empathy through pharmaceuticals for either the worst-off or, more
likely, for potential sacrificers.
47. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 29. For further discussion, see DOES HUMAN RIGHTS NEED
GOD? (Elizabeth M. Bucar & Barbra Barnett eds., 2005).
48. JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2, 15-18 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) [hereinafter
GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS]. For an authoritative view, see James Griffin, Remarks at the Book
Launch (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://ethics-etc.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/griffin.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2009). See also William J. Talbott, Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV.
(2008), available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/review. cftn?id=14645; Rowan Cruft, Two Approaches to
Human Rights, 60 PHIL. Q. 176 (2010).
49. For this distinction in a legal context, see R. George Wright, Two Models of
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1357 (1991). Of course, different networks of
theory may turn out to be equally coherent, or we may find the question of which network of theory
is more internally coherent to be unanswerable in any neutral way. For a brief version of a well-
known foundationalist approach to human rights, see Alan Gewirth, The Basis and Content of
Human Rights, in 23 NOMOS: HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.
1981). For critique, see, for example, Richard B. Friedman, The Basis of Human Rights: A
Criticism of Gewirth 's Theory, in 23 NOMAS: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 148.
50. See GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 4.
51. See id. at 123.
52. See id. at 149.
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• . .pursue our conception of a worthwhile life." 3 This capacity comprises
autonomous choice, free action on one's choices, and the social and economic
means necessary for one's autonomy and freedom.54 In addition, though, Griffin
emphasizes that human rights theory must take proper account of the nature and
limitations of human beings and their circumstances, or what Griffin calls"practicalities.""
The problem here is that Griffin's attempt to rely largely upon our best more
general ethical theory 6 ensures either the indeterminacy or, for many persons, the
arbitrariness of his theory. Griffin's reliance on the rational capacity for
normative agency in choosing and pursuing our understanding of a worthwhile
life would seem, for example, to rule out any human rights for kindergarten
students. There are of course, as Griffin recognizes, moral reasons not to
painlessly kill kindergarteners. But the idea of some human rights for
kindergarteners really does not seem to be an undue expansion of the core idea
of human rights.
Or we could instead think of an adult who has the capacity for rationally
formulating and pursuing a conception of the good life, but who has never
actually done so. Suppose a government violates that adult's human rights in
some way that predictably and perhaps intentionally motivates the adult to, for
the first time, actually formulate and pursue a plan of life-perhaps campaigning
against human rights violations. In such a case, a human rights violation perhaps
intentionally promotes the realization of what was once a mere unused capacity
for normative agency.
More fundamentally, the basic relationship between matters of fact and
matters of value is notjust a matter of overlap, as in Griffin's theory, but remains
broadly controversial." It is thus hardly surprising, overall, that Griffin must
end, as well as begin, with a substantial and disturbing realm of indeterminacy.58
V. COHEN ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF ULTIMATE PRINCIPLES FROM FACTS
The late G.A. Cohen's emphasis is partly on the manipulability and the
limited scope, within each society and beyond each individual society, of John
53. Id. at 45.
54. See id. at 149.
55. See id. at 37-39, 44.
56. See id. at 4.
57. See, e.g., THE Is/OuGHT QUESTION: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON THE CENTRALPROBLEM
IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (W.D. Hudson ed., 1969); W.D. Falk, Hume on Is and Ought, 6 CAN. J.
PinL. 359 (1976). Reference to "thick" concepts such as interests or pain does not resolve the
relevant debates. See also G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 248-50 (Harvard Univ.
Press 2008).
58. See GRIFFIN, ON HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 128 ("[Alt a fairly early point in
assessing policies such as 'Don't deliberately kill the innocent[,]' we reach a point where we can
no longer tell that one policy is better than another.").
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Rawls's famous "difference principle."59  Cohen's "luck egalitarianism"
challenges what is sometimes thought of a natural, unproblematic, or deserved
inegalitarian distribution of crucial economic assets, including one's scarce
talents, that can be manipulated for selfish economic advantage.60
Cohen's interests, however, are broad, and subtly articulated.6 Our focus
herein is on merely one claim that is fundamental to moral theory in general and
human rights theory in particular. Specifically, Cohen argues that the most basic
normative or moral principles cannot be justified by an appeal to any ordinary
facts or circumstances, even on a broad understanding of what counts as
"facts."62 We consider this issue not in order to try to resolve it, but to again
illustrate the increasing range of uncertainties underlying the very idea of human
rights.
In this respect, Cohen asks us to start with any principle we might choose
that is thought to be justified only when certain facts or circumstances hold, but
not otherwise. But we can then ask why this is so. Some further principle must
be invoked to explain why the earlier principle is justified only under certain
factual circumstances. And the second, explanatory principle may admittedly
also be based in part on certain facts. But eventually, Cohen thinks, our line of
justification must reach some ultimate normative principle that is independent of
and does not rely for its justification on any non-normative facts.63
Cohen recognizes that many of us think that even the most general human
rights principles must in some way reflect or be sensitive to some basic facts.6'
This is certainly not to accept the factual status quo, entrenched power
relationships, or privileges that may be widely taken for granted. Instead Cohen
argues that "a principle can reflect or respond to a fact only because it is also a
59. Rawls' difference principle, a secondary element of his theory ofjustice, requires, at the
level of the "basic structure" of society, that inequalities in basic goods including income be
arranged so that any inequalities maximize the absolute stock of such goods available to the worst-
off persons in that society. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 76 (1971). For an earlier
critique of the difference principle as variously insufficiently egalitarian, see R. George Wright, The
High Cost ofRawls'Inegalitarianism, 30 W. POL. Q. 73 (1977). See also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW
OFPEOPLES 116, 158-59 (1999).
60. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 7-8. For discussion, see, for example, Kok-Chor Tan, A
Defense of Luck Egalitarianism, 105 J. PHIL. 665 (2008), as well as the contributions of Richard
J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989) and Richard
J. Arneson, Justice Is Not Equality, in JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND CONSTRUCTVISM: ESSAYS ON G.A.
COHEN'S RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 5 (Brian Feltham ed., 2009).
61. See, for example, the particular reflections in G.A. COHEN, IF YOu'RE AN EGALITARIAN,
How COME YOU'RE So RICH? 120 (2000).
62. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 229-73; Thomas Pogge, Cohen to the Rescue!, in JUSTICE,
EQUALITY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM, supra note 60, at 88-109; see also Jon Mandle, Book Review,
NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV. available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfrn?id=16945; Ingrid Robeyns,
Review, 120 ETHICS 156 (2009).
63. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 232, 237, 291; Pogge, supra note 62, at 103.
64. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 231.
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response to a [further or deeper] principle that is not a response to a fact. 65
This does not seem to be true of all principles outside of morality and human
rights. Suppose we keep pressing someone as to why they are mowing someone
else's lawn. They respond that money is involved, and then the consumption of
ice cream, with due concerns for cost and health. Finally we are reduced to
asking the person, who as a matter of subjective taste prefers chocolate, why they
have on this occasion chosen chocolate. If the person at this stage has not run out
of (non-moral) principles, he or she might say that under these (or relevantly
similar) circumstances, one can reasonably indulge one's strongest current
subjective taste in ice cream.
But even this principle implicitly includes reference to facts and
circumstances, including distinguishing flavors, aromas, consistencies, and
illustrating that taste can cause pleasure, and in different degrees. One need not,
thankfully, rely on some sort of idea of bettemess-of-chocolate that holds under
all imaginable circumstances.
These relevant facts about persons, tastes, and pleasures could have been
different, in which case whatever (non-moral) principles we might have held
would likely require modification. And it is hard to see how shifting the focus
to human rights principle removes the ultimate dependence of the most basic
human rights principles on general facts and circumstances.
Human rights principles, even at some ultimate level, seem to depend for
their normative force, and even for their meaning, on various sorts of facts
regarding scarcity, limitations of resources, human vulnerabilities and
insufficiencies, the need for cooperation and communication for certain tasks,
varying levels of human interests and aspirations, and so on. The morality and
law of human rights, even at the most basic level, would look different if these
basic facts and circumstances were different.
Now, it may be possible to aggregate any of the above basic principles, along
with all the relevant facts and circumstances, into one grand-if realistically
unusable-principle, and then assert that this inarticulable compound normative
principle, incorporating all the relevant facts, is itself not dependent upon any
further, yet unassimilated facts. But one would then be left to wonder about the
significance, in theory or practice, of the meaningfulness of an inexpressible,
pages-long principle.
But if Cohen is even arguably right about an obviously important matter
here,66 we have yet another example of the increasing fragmentation and
controversiality of the very idea of human rights.
VI. SANDEL, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE GHOSTS OF METAPHYSICS
Michael J. Sandel's popular course-based book on justice is already
65. Id. at 232 (emphasis omitted).
66. The relevant idea of sensitivity of a principle to facts may be ambiguous. See POGGE,
supra note 62, at 93.
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something of an academic phenomenon, spawning its own website,67 Facebook
page,68 PBS television series, 69 and a Today show promotion "sandwiched
between a cooking demonstration and a segment on a turtle named Lucky."7
The book's primary emphasis is on substantive or normative ethics,7 with only
modest attention paid explicitly to the theory of human rights, or to metaethical
issues in general. We can, however, briefly note Sandel's discussion of
utilitarianism, and its implications for human rights, and conclude with a bit of
speculation about more metaphysical matters.
It has, of late, been argued that a focus on welfare or utility offers theoretical
and practical advantages over a continuing focus on human rights.7 2 Sandel
points to some standard critical responses to relying on utilitarianism. Only
contingency, or chance, links maximizing utility, even over the long run, and the
basic rights of innocent victims.73 However we think of utility or welfare
maximization,74 there can be no guarantee-in the sense that an absolutist7"
human rights norm provides a theoretical guarantee-against any authorized
violation of evidently basic rights. In contrast, it is also possible that forms of
utilitarianism that do not explicitly refer to human rights might, in practice, wind
up protecting human rights more effectively than any explicit regime of human
67. Harvard University's Justice with Michael Sandel, http://justiceharvard.org/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2009).
68. Readily befriendable under the search query Michael Sandel on Justice.
69. See Patricia Cohen, Morals Class Is Starting: Please Pass the Popcorn, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2009, at C 1.
70. Id.
71. In general, asking students to evaluate the moral behavior, say of actors in an economic
market, before studying the perhaps less superficially interesting theory and operation of regulated
and unregulated markets, carries some predictable risks.
72. See POSNER, supra note 2. For general commentary on utilitarianism with human rights
implications, see sources cited supra notes 25-27. Classically, see the debate between J.J.C. SMART
& BERNARD WILUAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973). While we cannot summarily
critique Eric Posner's approach, supra, the advantages claimed for focusing on well-being rather
than on human rights are unclear. For one thing, the two concepts typically overlap, and human
rights still, as of now, carries more evocative and motivational force as rhetoric. There is also likely
to be a tradeoffbetween the verifiability of compliance with welfare norms and the claimed fairness
or feasibility of compliance. It is just as easy to blame outsider misconduct and unfairness for
internal economic performance as for internal human rights violations. Also, some human rights
theories allow for defeasibility and for practicalities and tradeoffs. See GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 48. The popularity of enforceable human rights as well as welfare norms
largely depends on the level of generality at which each is formulated. But all of this may be fairly
debated.
73. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING TO Do? 50-51 (2009).
74. See Lyons, supra note 25.
75. For a debate over moral absolutism, see Patrick Hawley, MoralAbsolutism Defended, 105
J. PHIL. 273 (2008); Frank Jackson & Michael Smith, Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty,
103 J. PHIL. 267 (2006).
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rights.76
As hazy as these considerations may be, Sandel leaves us with much to think
about, little ultimate clarity, in the area of the metaphysics of ethics and of human
rights. Consider Sandel's earlier book on ethics and biotechnology.77 There,
Sandel argues that "eugenics and genetic engineering... represent the one-sided
triumph of willfulness over giftedness, of dominion over reverence, of molding
over beholding,"78 and a loss of "our sense of giftedness[.]"79  This is a
fascinating and academically unusual language. Sandel immediately argues that
these concerns need not be accounted for in religious terms; ° they can apparently
have a sufficient, independent, and self-standing "secular" justification as well.8"
Sandel rightly points out that the loss of a "sense of giftedness"--imagine a
future child as a genetically custom-designed consumer product-implicates
"humility, responsibility, and solidarity,"82 and thus potentially the scope and
meaning of human rights.83 For our purposes, we should point out that familiar
theories of human rights depend, ultimately, on our beliefs about human
responsibility falling within only a narrow "middle" portion of the much broader
possible range of beliefs about human responsibility. Persons must bear neither
too little, nor too much, responsibility for a viable and full human rights regime.
Let us briefly explore this idea.
At both extremes of the idea of responsibility, the logic and motivation of at
least some human rights must eventually dissolve. This is true even if we
continue to use the same human rights terminology, evacuated of its traditional
meaning. If, toward one end of the spectrum, we adopt a materialist view of the
world, confined largely to some combination of determinism and randomness, we
may continue to use the terminology of responsibility and human rights, but those
ideas would eventually become a corsage, rather than a living, rooted plant.84
76. This possibility would mirror the idea that we may not best achieve happiness, or
maximize utility, by consciously and explicitly aiming at happiness or a utility maximization.
77. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING (2007) [hereinafter SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION]; see also Michael J.
Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2004, available at http://www.theatlantic.
com/ doc/200404/sandel.
78. See the book version of SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION, supra note 77, at 85.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 85-86.
81. See id. at 86.
82. Id. at 85-86.
83. For some background speculation, see R. George Wright, Personhood 2.0: Enhanced
and Unenhanced Persons and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1047
(2005).
84. Of course, some persons and groups may continue to have various self-interested reasons
for continuing to talk of human rights. For a dramatic formulation of contemporary materialism,
consider: "[a] few years ago, Stephen Hawking summed up scientists' prevailing attitude toward
the status of life in the universe. 'The human race is just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized
planet."' PAULDAVtES, COSMIC JACKPOT: WHY OUR UNIVERSE IS JUST RIGHT FOR LIFE 222 (2007)
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Too little meaningful responsibility and related ideas, and the meaning and
motivational force of human rights must eventually wither.
But consider the other end of the range of possibilities about responsibility.
If the scope of the genuine freedom, autonomy, and control85 of persons really
expands beyond a certain point, each of us becomes largely responsible for our
own outcomes, given the risks we have genuinely freely chosen to run. Thus, as
our personal and group responsibility expands, the logic and motivation for those
human rights focused on solidarity, fraternity, and material equality of outcome
would tend to dissolve.86
What is left unclear is why Sandel would regret the loss of solidarity-the
pharmacology of minimizing the pains of empathy should by then be well-
developed-if genuine freedom, autonomy, and personal control really do
expand along with our personal responsibility. Is Sandel's regret mainly a matter
of a fear that we will sometimes mistakenly find personal responsibility where
none really exists? Or is this mainly just a matter of empathy, of compassion for
human weakness, suffering, or regretted outcomes, however genuinely freely and
responsibly bad outcomes were risked? We may certainly share such a response,
but compassion for freely and responsibly risked disappointments hardly seems
an adequate basis for a responsive human right.
Ultimately, Sandel's thinking, along with that of the preceding authors
reviewed, each in their diverse ways, inadvertently illustrates the fragility,
fragmentation, and continuing disintegration of the contemporary idea of human
rights.
VII. CHARLES R. BEITZ'S PRACTICE-ORIENTED APPROACH TO
THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Charles R. Beitz has been reflecting on the theory and practice of human
rights for some time." Professor Beitz begins with the observation that the
increasing prominence of the idea of human rights has not made "any more clear
what kinds of objects human rights are supposed to be."88 Briefly, Beitz's main
thesis is that "human rights" is "not so much an abstract normative idea as an
emergent political practice."89
(quoting DAVID DEUTSCH, THE FABRIC OF REALITY 177-78 (1997)). For an introduction to some
contending views on free will and responsibility, see JOHN MARTIN FISCHER ET AL., FOUR VIEWS
ON FREE WILL (2007).
85. No doubt freedom, autonomy, and control could easily be counted as human rights
themselves, but it is at best unclear that they exhaust the scope of all recognized human rights.
86. Most clearly, "luck egalitarianism" no longer asks much if the only (bad) luck we
encounter is the result of risks we have genuinely freely chosen to run. See sources cited supra note
60. For some complications, see Wright, supra note 83.
87. For one brief prior account, now revised and expanded, see Charles Beitz, What Human
Rights Mean, 132 DAEDALUS 36 (2003).
88. CHARLES R. BErrZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at xi (2009).
89. Id. at xii.
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The gist of his position is that we should look primarily to international
practice and to function rather than looking to the broad family of natural rights
or natural law theories for basic normative and conceptual guidance.9" A bit
more elaborately, Beitz focuses on the developing, maturing, critiquable, partly
controversial global discourse and practice of human rights, with its various
actors, levels, stages, and other complications, and with an eye toward the
presumably most-persuasive interpretations of those various interests we deem,
perhaps from beneficence, to be most valuable and important.9
Professor Beitz thus rejects a "foundationalist" approach: "[H]uman rights
need not be interpreted as deriving their authority from a single [or plural,
actually], more basic value or interest such as those of human dignity,
personhood, or membership."92  Such approaches are said to be inevitably
misleading as to the grounds, scope, and implementation of human rights.93
One problem with this critical claim is that the vast range and diversity of the
evolving natural right and natural law, or other foundationalist approaches to
what we now call human rights must almost guarantee for most critiques will be
largely true of some such approaches, partly true of others, and almost entirely
untrue of yet others. For example, far from deferring to the propertied classes
mainstream doctrines from the Middle Ages through Immanuel Kant can be hair-
raisingly bold in their direct redistributive and legal implications compared to
today's standards.94
The continuing role of the broad family of natural right and natural law
approaches to human rights is subject to reasonable contest. Certainly, the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself makes only briefly stated,
unelaborated metaphysical commitments as to the nature of human rights.95 But
this hardly reflects a consensus post-metaphysical turn among the delegates.
Rather, the breadth and variety of metaphysical and political commitments
among the delegates naturally suggested an attempt to set aside as much as
possible the question of the nature and justification of human rights, for the sake
of a consensus document.
But this lack of consensus, again, can hardly guarantee that individual and
collective human rights actors need not depend today, and in the future, on their
residual, or even abandoned, metaphysical commitments. Some sort of
metaphysics may be necessary for meaningful normative guidance of the practice
90. See id. at 7-9.
91. See id. at 7-12.
92. Id. at 128.
93. Seeid. at51.
94. See, e.g., THOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, question 66, art. 7, respondio
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 2d rev. ed. 1920) (Kevin Knight online ed.
2008), available at http://www.newadvent.org/surmma/306607.htm); see also ST. BONAVENTURE,
The Life of St. Francis, in THE SOUL'S JOURNEY INTO GOD, THE TREE OF LIFE, THE LIFE OF ST.
FRANCIS 177, 254 (Ewert Cousins trans., Paulist Press ed. 1978) (1263); IMMANUEL KANT,
EDUCATION § 98, at 105 (Annette Churton trans., Univ. Michigan Press 1964) (1803).
95. See BEITZ, supra note 88, at 8.
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of human rights. In the long run, metaphysics-the deeper "why" questions and
their answers-may also be necessary to motivate the sacrifices sometimes called
for by human rights, as human rights are commonly understood. In the end,
whether which we can develop a worthy and sustainable international and global
system of human rights by foregrounding practice and backgrounding, or even
setting aside, the broad evolving family of natural rights and natural law theories
is yet another unresolved matter of increasing contest and controversy.96
96. For a further recent discussion of a more political, as opposed to natural rights-oriented
approach to human rights, see Kenneth Baynes, Toward a Political Conception of Human Rights,
35 PHIL. & Soc. CRITICISM 371 (2009).
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